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ABSTRACr
Thesearch for microeconomic foundations of rion—Wairasian outcomes
In labor and product markets has spawned many studies of contracting.
This paper emphasizes the role of contracts for market equilibrium——for
many raw materials and basic industrial commodities——In which long—term
contractual arrangements and spot markets coexist. Our principal goals
are two——(I) to explain the existence of contracts and the equilibrium
fraction of trades carried out under contract, and (ii) to consider the
impact of demand and supply shocks on spot prices when market trades
also take place through long—term contracts.
We find that the relative importance of contracting depends on,
inter alla, the variance of the spot price and the sources of underlying
fluctuations. Consistent with the findings of previous macroeconomic
studies, we find that contracting and price rigidity are more likely the
more important demand shocks are relative to supply shocks. We adapt
our static model of contract price and quantity determination to discuss
the adjustment of contract prices. Finally, we discuss three important
applications of our multiple—price modeling structure——to (I) analyses
of the effects of changes in vertical market structure on market
equilibrium in commodity markets (with specific reference to petroleum
and copper), (ii) models of the optimal degree of contract indexation,
and (iii) aggregate studies of "sticky prices" In macroeconomics.
R. Glenn Hubbard IobertJ. Weiner
tpartirentof Economics Departnt of Economics
Northwestern University Harvard University
Indersen Hall, 2003 Sheridan Road Cambridge, M?\ 02138
Evanston,IL 60201—1—
I.INTRODUCTION
Studies of price adjustment in commodity and industrial product
markets have been a key element of research in macroeconomics and
industrial organization for decades. Outside the static and
instantaneous market clearing in textbook models, an important goal for
economic theory is to provide an explanation of how prices move to clear
markets. For a variety of Issues from assessing the efficiency of
commodity markets to testing price flexibility in Industrial markets to
measuring the sensitivity of aggregate prices and quantities to demand—
management policies, it is not sufficient to maintain that Wairasian
equilibria will be obtained, without describing the process of
adjustment.
The failure of the Walrasian, market—clearing framework to explain
movements in prices and quantities has been a focus of macroeconomics
since the Keynesian revolution.' Particular emphasis has been placed on
"sticky wages" in labor markets and "sticky prices" in goods markets.2
Outside of Keynesian macroeconomics, Means's (1935) assertion that
market power led to sticky "administered" prices prompted an ongoing
debate in industrial organization.
Previous efforts at motivating these rigidities have classified
product markets into "auction" and "customer" categories (the terms are
from Okun, 1981). The principal goal of this paper is to characterize
price flexibility in markets exhibiting both fixed—price and flexIble—
price behavior. The basic model put forth in section II Is of interest
as an intermediate case between the "no contracting, instantaneous price
adjustment" Wairasian model and the "contracting only, no price
adjustment" models recently investigated by Carlton (1978, 1979b) and—2—
Gould (1978). The model is an alternative to one constructed by Akerlof
and Yellen (1985a, 1985b), in which the intermediate case arises because
a fixed fraction of the agents in the market are assumed to be non—
maximizers. Some of the results from our model, in which all agents
optimize, are similar to theirs.
A line of research in the recent macroeconomics literature has
focused on the microfoundations of price flexibility (Rotemberg, 1982;
Mankiw, 1985; Taylor, 1979). When prices are neither inflexible nor
perfectly flexible, multiple prices are likely to occur.4 Multiple—
price arrangements are prevalent in commodities5, and in industrial
goods.6 In the static model, we consider both cases of competitive and
monopoly producer behavior. We illustrate how an endogenously
determined multiple—price system can provide a foundation for models of
the form suggested by Taylor (1979), and contrast it with the
alternative foundation suggested by Akerlof and Yellen (1985b).
Our modeling framework is based on Canton (1979a). Carlton
derived the relationship between spot and contract prices in a model
with two types of buyers——those who must contract in advance for
planning purposes and those who can purchase on auction markets. In our
model, buyers and sellers choose the extent to which they rely on
contracting. In general, the contracting regime and hence the degree of
price flexibility depend on the variance of the spot price, relative
prices in spot markets, and the covariances of these prices with buyer
and seller profits in the absence of contracting. An extension to
multiperlod contracts is also presented.
In Section III, we apply the model to analyze the impact of
contracting on the adjustment of prices to demand and supply—3—
fluctuations in a framework based on the labor—market model of Taylor
(1979) and the one—price commodity market model of Turnovsky (1983).
Introducing speculative storage, we find that even transitory demand and
supply fluctuations exhibit "persistence effects" on spot prices in the
presence of contracts. At the close of the paper, we put forth three
potential applications of the multiple—price modeling structure——to (i)
analyses of the effects of changes In vertical market structure on
market equilibrium in commodity markets (with specific reference to
petroleum and copper), (ii) models of the optimal—degree of contract
indexation, and (iii) aggregate studies of "sticky prices" in
macroeconomics.
II. CONTRACTING AND MULTIPLE—PRICE SYSTEMS IN PRODUCT MARKETS
Equilibrium Spot and Contract Trades: Static Model
The coexistence of "predetermined" and "flexible" factors In a
market requires at least two prices. For simplicity, suppose that
contracts are identical, thereby reducing the number of prices to two ——
the"contract price" and the "spot price." In a multiple—price system,
the decision of how much to buy (to produce) Is accompanied by a
decision of how to divide purchases (sales) between spot and contract
markets. We define a contract as an ongoing agreement to purchase a
coimnodity at a given price. Because of the definition of contracts,
shocks (unanticipated exogenous changes in demand or force majeure
interruption of contract completion) are absorbed through adjustment on
the spot market.—4—
Buyers' Problem
Buyers use the commodity purchased as an input in production and
are subject to random demand disturbances. They can buy on both spot
and contract markets. The tradeoff between the two types of purchasers
stems from the fact that while price is fixed for contract purchases,
spot purchases can be tailored to meet demand exactly. Once contract
purchases have been optimized (qc*), spot purchases are chosen to
maximize the expected profit 11b
b scss cc* (1) 11 PZ(Q +Q)—PQ—PQ
where Z is the production function (Z > 0, Z < 0), and P is the output
(downstream) price. Buyers are assumed to be price—takers in the input
market.
The first—order condition yields the standard result for inputs,
namely that the factor price and the value of marginal product are
equalized:
(2) QS*= Z(p5/p )qC*
Buyers are assumed to exhibit constant absolute risk aversion and
choose contract purchases qc to maximize
(3) Ellb_ varb,
where y measures the degree of risk aversion, and E 11b and var
respectively represent the expectation and variance of the outcome—5—
conditional upon available information. The optimal contract purchase
follows from the first—order condition, and is equal to
sc s * EP—P cov(P,1I)
(4) QC= —___________
'yvarp5 varpS
where 11b denotes the (ex ante) profit in the absence of contracting, and
coy (pS 11b) represents the covarlance of the spot price and 11b it is
important to note that risk aversion is not necesary for the form of
these results. Canton (1979a) puts forth a similar model in which the
incentive to offer long—term contracts stems from the influences of
cash—flow variability on a firm's costs.
The first term in equation (4) demonstrates that desired contract
purchases depend on the spread between the contract price and the
expected spot price, the degree of buyer risk aversion, and the variance
of the spot price. An increase in the variance of the spot price,
ceteris paribus, lowers the reliance on long—term contracts. The second
term in (4) recognizes the importance of the covariance of the spot
price and ex ante profit, and its sign depends on the origin of the
shock. For example, if all shocks stemmed from the supply side,
coy (pS, 11b) < 0, and buyers could purchase through contracts even when
the quoted contract price exceeds the expected spot price. With the
addition of demand shocks, coy (pS flb) could be positive, so that
purchasers desire contracting only when the contract price is offered at
a discount to the spot price.7—6—
Producers' Problem
Producers (sellers) are assumed to maximize the certainty
equivalent of profit lip, and to exhibit constant absolute risk
aversion. Their objective is to
(5) max {pcQc +E(p5 qS) —EC (Qc +qS)—- var[pSQS_ c(QC+ QS)JJ
where C is the cost function (C > 0) andmeasures the degree of risk
aversion.
Below we formulate the solution under the polar cases of
competition and monopoly. For a competitor, the equilibrium spot price
will satisfy the condition that price equals marginal cost, while the
monopolist's analogue is the equalization of marginal revenue and
marginal cost. That is, under competition,
s*
'c* s*
(6) P=C(Q+Q), andunder monopoly,
s* —1
'c* s*
(7) P (1FnD)=c(Q +Q)
where is the price elasticity of demand.
For the case of competition, (5) is maximized with respect
to 0c subject to
(8) QS =c(PS)qc*
to yield—7—
C S * P—EP sp
(9) QC +cov(P,1I)
varP8 varp5
where lI denotes profit in the absence of contracting. The similarity
between the general form of the optimal contract purchase (in equation
(4)) and the optimal contract sale (in equation (9)) is clear.
Ceteris paribus, producers prefer to sell more through long—term
contracts the greater is the excess of the contract price over the
expected spot price. With demand variability only, contracting can take
place even if the contract price is less than the spot price. With both
supply and demand shocks, the second term in (9) can be negative, so
that no contract trade occurs unless Pc > E pS
Hence, knowledge of both buyers' and sellers' contract decisions
and of the source of the shocks is necessary to determine market
equilibrium. So that we can determine market equilibrium from the
contracting behavior of individual firms, we suppose that the upstream
and downstream industries consist of identical firms: s sellers and b
buyers. Under the assumption of rational expectations, equating
simultaneously supply and demand in the spot and contract markets yields





(11) Ps =Z(5 + C) =C'(+ S)
where and qC denote total spot and contract volumes, respectively.—8—
Equation (10) reveals that the expected spot price is an unbiased
predictor of the spot price only if at least one of the parties is risk—
neutral (i.e., only if y=0 or =0).The difference between the two
prices depends in sign and in magnitude on the correlation between the
spot price and total profits in the absence of contracting.
When sellers are competitive, the equilibrium volume of total
contract trades is just
s 'p s
(12) QC = coy (P ,11)— ycoy (P ,II)
+
-p.)varr'8
No contract trade takes place unless the right—hand side of equation
(12) is positive. In equilibrium, the extent of contracting depends on
a weighted average of the covariance of the spot price with sellers'
profits in the absence of contracting and (the opposite of) the,
covariance of the spot price with buyer's ex ante profits, with the
weights being measures of the parties' risk aversion.
The components of the covariance terms in (12) have an intuitive
interpretation. The standard deviations of the profits in the absence
of contracting indicate the varibility of buyer and seller profits in
auction markets. Signs and magnitudes of the correlations of the spot
price with buyer and seller profits depend on the source of the
underlying shocks, that is, whether shocks come more from the demand
side or the supply side. Under reasonable assumptions about the
production function and demand curve, it can be shown that
the correlation coefficients are positive when most uncertainty stems
from the demand side, and negative when most uncertainty stems from the
supply side (see Weiner, 1985 for a derivation). We measure the
"vulnerability" of market participants when there is no contracting by—9—
the absolute value of the product of the risk aversion coefficient and
the covarlance of profits with the spot price. Some cases are reviewed
below.
First, note that if we let p and a represent a correlation





sothat contracting takes place whenever
(12a) 4Dc
>4,1)jb
This condition is most easily understood as follows. If only
sellers are risk—averse, then contracting takes place only if
> 0, that is, if demand shocks are the source of uncertainty.
Similarly, if only buyers are risk—averse, contracting takes place if
uncertainty stems from the supply side (i.e., ps < 0). More
generally, both demand— and supply—side uncertainty will be present, so
that both the source of disturbances (sign of the correlation
coefficients) and the relative vulnerability (again measured by the
absolute value of the product of the covariance of the spot price and
profits in the absence of contracting weighted by the risk aversion
parameter) are needed to determine the extent of contracting. These












































































































































































































































































































Equation(12') and Table I suggest intuitively that contracts are
signed (i) when most shocks come from the supply side and buyers'
profits are more vulnerable than sellers' to spot price risk, and (ii)
when demand shocks are more important and sellers' profits are more
vulnerable.
As a convenient summary statistic, we can write the equilibrium
fraction of trades carried out under contract a as






+— C (F5) (var pS)
Note that this is not a "solution" for a, since a and var pS are
simultaneously determined (i.e., aa/avar P5 < 0 from (13), and
avar PS/aa > 0 by Le Chatelier's principle——the greater the fraction of
trades carried out under contracts, the more variable the market—
clearing spot price). We return to this issue later.
In general, sellers' profits should be more vulnerable to spot
price fluctuations than buyers' profits, so long as the value of any
given intermediate purchase is sinai! relative to the value of output.8
Then, in the context of the model presented here, contracting is more
likely the more important demand shocks are relative to supply shocks.
These results are consistent with those of some previous studies. As
would be predicted by the price asynchronization model of Blanchard
(1982), prices should be more flexible in industries in early stages of
production than in finished—goods Industries. Finally, the predictions
of the model may be useful In explaining failures in obtaining
reasonable econometric estimates of price equations. Certainly,
problems with estimating such price equations with government price— 11—
indices(e.g., Bureau of Labor Statistics data) are well known (see for
example Nordhaus; 1972; Canton, 1979a). Canton notes particularly
that the influence of demand fluctuations on prices has been difficult
to Isolate.rn this model, a dominance of demand fluctuations would
lead to nominal price rigidity, and precisely the Inability to estimate
demand influences on prices.
Monopoly
The monopolist's problem is to choose the contract price pC or
contract sales Q so as to maximize the certainty equivalent of
prof it.9 We let the producer choose pC to maxmize equatIon (5) above
subject to the condition that
(14) qS =R'(P)—QC
where R denotes the marginal revenue function.
Incorporating the information about the buyers' spot and contract
demands conditions on pC and pS, we can rewrite (5) as
E Ps_Pc s Th
(15) max pC1 __________
—coy + E [P8 R'(p) —pSQCJ
P yvarp varP
—E C(R(P)) —var[pS Rl(P8) —p5QC_ C(R1(P))}}.
The contract price can be solved from the first—order condition and the
market equilibrium condition to be:
coy (pS HP + (b + .1) 11b)
/' c_I,1.s __________________ 16) P —
2 b
(-+—3— 12—
whilethe spot price solves
(17) R z() =
Againnote that if the buyer is risk—neutral, the contract price and
expected spot price are equal.
Given the expression for the contract price in equation (16) above,
the equilibrium spot and contract volumes are
(18) QS* =R1(P)—QCand
c* b
8coy(pS P) —ycoy (5flb)
(19) =b8+2y s 3.
varP
Denoting the equilibrium fraction of trades carried out through
contracts byas before, we see that
b
8coy(pS jP) —ycoy (s11b)
(20) =
b8+2Y (c (pS)) (var pS)
Again,depends on the degree of risk aversion, the source of
uncertainty, and the variance of the spot price, the higher is the
variance of the spot price, the lower the fraction of trades carried out
under contract.— 13—
Comparisonof Competitive and Monopoly Outcomes
It is useful to compare the monopoly and competitive solutions
under the two—price system. As long as the market can be described as
"demand—shocks—only" or "supply—shocks—only," the relationship between
the spot and contract prices is similar to that in the competitive
case. As under competition, the contract and expected spot prices are
equal when buyers are risk—neutral. That is not true, however, under
seller risk neutrality; the monopolist does not provide "contract
insurance" without additional compensation. Finally, using equations
(12) and (19), we can compare the contract volumes under competition and
monopoly. With seller risk neutrality, we obtain the usual result that
the monopoly volume is half of the competitive volume.
The relationship between market structure and price flexibility has
figured prominently in debates in industrial organization since Means's
advancement of the "administered prices" hypothesis. Focusing on the
polar cases of competition and monopoly, we can address in the context
of our model whether, ceteris paribus, monopolists have stickier prices
than competitors. The hypothesis of a positive relationship between
industry concentration and price rigidity implies that a should be
larger under monopoly. That is, holding constant across market
structures the values of the risk aversion parameters and the
covariances of buyer and seller profits with the spot price, contracting
and price rigidity are more extensive under monopoly if
1 1 c 1 1 i 1
(21) 2v) "'—1S > ) t_1 ),or







C1 (p5) i +b— 14—
whereP and Prepresent the prices corresponding to the equilibrium
quantities where price equals marginal cost and marginal revenue equals
marginal cost, respectively.
The value of the expression on the left—hand side of the inequality
in (22) is at least unity, since total competitive production must
exceed monopoly production. The expression on the right—hand side is
bounded between one and two.
No unambiguous result can be delineated, but some special cases are
illustrative. In the case wherein marginal cost curves and demand
curves are linear, contracting (and price rigidity) is necessarily
greater under monopoly only if buyers are risk—neutral. In general, the
result depends on the slopes of the demand and marginal cost curves.
Price flexibility will be relatively greater under monopoly the steeper
is the marginal cost curve or the flatter is the demand curve.
Associating changes in marginal cost with changes in capacity
utilization, the former implies that a monopolist would be more likely
to raise prices during booms in this case.
III. CONTRACTING AND PRICE ADJUSTMENT
Obtaining closed—form solutions for c'. and var P5 requires the
specification of functional forms for the demand and marginal cost
curves. In so doing, we chose a modeling framework that will also allow
us to consider the Impact of contracting on the "persistence" demand and
supply shocks on prices. Turnovsky (1983) has considered the
persistence effects of transitory shocks on prices in markets for
storable commodities. Recent macroeconomic models of the influence of— 15—
laborcontracts on the behavior of wages and prices (e.g., Fischer,
1977; Taylor, 1979) have also focused on the "persistence issue and
have considered roles for stabilization policy in the presence of
contracts.
If in the absence of storage, there were a single spot price for a
given commodity, then transitory shocks could exert no persistence;
there would only be a one—period change in the price. If the good were
sold only through long—term contracts, the persistence of transitory
fluctuations would be imbedded in the ability of contract provisions to
adjust to market conditions. With trade on both spot and contract
markets, shifts in the mix of spot and contract trades can alter the
short—run and long—run impacts of shocks on prices.
To facilitate comparison with other studies, smoothing, we
introduce speculative stockpiling by third parties, following
Turnovsky.1° We then examine the impact of a two—price system on market
equilibrium in the presence of demand and supply disturbances. Both
contracting and storability will affect not only the Immediate impact of
transitory shocks on current—period spot prices, but also persistence of
that impact. Further, both the variance of the distribution of spot
prices will be altered.
Total demand is the sum of consumption and inventory demands.
Price—taking, risk—neutral speculators trade in Inventories on the spot
market in anticipation of changes in price. Speculators are assumed to
(23) max E{((1+o)' +1
— — - I}— 16—
whereI represents the end—of—period stock level and d is the discount
rate (identical to that of the buyers and sellers). Holding stocks Is
assumed to be costly——in fact, increasingly costly——In the size of the
stock due to payments to factors fixed in the short run (e.g., storage
facilities). Thus changes in price expectations cannot be fully acted
upon instantaneously. We model such costs as quadratic, the simplest
specification of "diminishing returns;" these costs are indexed by the
parameter h."
Maximizing (23) with respect to I yields the following demand
function for stocks:
(24) It =h((1+6) —
Aswith most other studies since the original development by Muth
(1961), speculative holdings are a function of the expected increase in
price —takinginto account the cost of adjusting stock levels.
To obtain solutions forand var pS we suppose that, in the
absence of shocks, the demand function is linear and of the form
(25) =
a—dP,
and that the cost function is such that
(26) C =F+c
so that
(27) C'(Q) =cQ.— 17—
Furthersuppose that the market is subject to additive demand and supply
shocks and CSt: respectively, that are Identically and independently
distributed with mean zero and variances and ,respectively.
In the competitive case, buyers and sellers carry out planned spot
purchases and sales equal to (1—c)(a—dP5) and (l—a)c'P, respectively,
where cz is an equilibrium parameter determined as before with respect to
"normal sales" (excluding speculative stockpile movements). Inventory
movements as well as demand and supply shocks are also absorbed on the
spot market. For example, an interruption in contract
supply < 0) affects the market as follows. There Is excess demand
at the prevailing contract price, and the spot market functions to
absorb disturbances. Given an optimal choice of c, equilibrium in the
spot market requires that
(28) (1—cs) c P5 + = —EtlP
+
To facilitate the solution for the spot price, we first define
lower—case p's as prices in deviation form. That is,
(29) p =
—
whereS is the long—run equilibrium price at which expectations are
realized. We can then rewrite equation (28) as
(30) [(1—a) (c+d) + 2h'J Dt —St+ hp1 + h'Etp+l— 18—
Underthe assumption of rational expectations, we can solve the
second—order inhomogeneous difference equation in (30) by standard
methods to yield
CDCS
(31) p =41p +
t
(1—ct) (c +d) + h (2—41)
where 4'isthe root within the unit circle of the quadratic equation
h12 + ((1—cx) (c+d) + 2h') 41 + h =0.
Even transitory shocks exhibit persistence effects on the spot
price, because of inventory behavior and because of the existence of






Again, with transitory shocks, the variance of the spot price
depends on a: 3 var PS/3a > 0.While the use of long—term contracts is
often seen as an instrument of price stability, this inequality
indicates that maintenance of contract prices in the presence of
fluctuating supply and demand increases variability in the spot
market. Equations (13) and (32) constitute a pair of nonlinear
relationships between a and var pS• These nonhinearitles can cause
problems of nonuniqueness and nonexistence of rational expectations
equilibria (see McCafferty and Driskill, 1980). Given our assumptions
of linear demand and marginal cost curves and the results In equations
(13) and (32), we can write the implicit expression for a as the
solution to— 19—
p)ap -sjb)cib2 [('—a) +d)+h(2-)
(33) c =
C_l(PS)(Y÷8) +cr
It can be easily shown that the signs of the derivatives of c with
respect to the underlying parameters—measures of rIsk aversIon, the
correlations of buyer and seller profits with spot price movements, the
variability of profits in the absence of contracting, and the variances
of supply and demand shocks—are exactly as in equation (13) before.
Three relationships between the persistence parameter ijandthe
underlying structural parameters are of interest. First, since
dç/da > 0, the larger is the fraction of trades carried out under
contracts, the greater is the persistence. Second, dp/dd < 0, so that
the greater is the demand response to a change in price, the smaller is
the initial increase In price and the lower is the persistence. These
two relationships imply that Increasing the fraction of trades carried
out under contracts will increase the variance of the spot price, while
higher values of d will lead to a smaller variance of the spot
price.12 Third, since dP/dh < 0, the less costly, is stock adjustment
(and hence the greater the speculative response to expected price
changes), the greater is the persistence effect on prices of a
transitory shock.— 20—
Extensionto Multiperiod Contracts
The expression for the spot price derived above can be used in the
context of multiperiod contracts to motivate the sort of price
adjustment model suggested by Taylor (1979). Consider a contract
lasting T periods.13 Discount rates for buyers and sellers are set
equal to a common rate 5.We consider the competitive case below; the
monopoly case is analogous.







where the weights & are contructed so that =(l+o)_t/ (1+c5)
t=0
=1.The sellers' case derives analogously. Equilibrium in spot
t=0
andcontract markets gives an optimal contract price of
s'pb T cov(P, sIT +blI)
(35) PC=(E
0 t (b÷S)
Equation (35) illustrates the importance of expectations of the
spot price over the duration of the contract in determining the
equilibrium contract price. When buyers or sellers are risk—neutral,
the contract price is a weighted average of expected future spot
prices. Hence expectations of future demand and supply shocks can
influence the current contract price. In general, the difference
between the contract price and the weighted average of expected future
spot prices depends on sources of underlying disturbances, market
structure, and the degree of risk aversion of trading parties.— 21—
Nowconsider the simple case of two—period contracts. When shocks
are transitory, we can combine equations (31) and (35) to yield the
following expression for adjustment of the contract price:









Equation(36) provides a formal justification for the model of
contract price adjustment suggested by Taylor (1979)——in which market
participants consider lagged and expected future prices and the impact
of current—period shocks——and can be considered in three parts. First,
whether the contract price exceeds, equals, or is exceeded by the
function of the spot price and market conditions embodied in the first
two terms of (36) depends on buyer and seller risk aversion and the
covariance of thespotprice and profits in the absence of
contracting. Second, in the first term of (36), the distribution of
weight placed on the long—run mean spot price versus that placed on the
weighted average of current, lagged, and expected future spot prices
depends on the magnitude of the persistence parameter P.Thegreater
is th persistence, the smaller is the weight placed on the long—run
price. The weights on current, lagged, and expected future spot prices
are a function of the discount rate. When=0, == 2=4
,and
equal weight is placed on the three spot prices. Finally, both current— 22—
demandand supply shocks matter for the determination of the contract
price in the current period.
Note that when IP=O, equation (36) is exactly the expression for the
contract price in the static model derived previously. The Importance
of P in (36) indicates the role of decisions about the use of long—term
contracts and Inventories In determining the sensitivity of the prices
on newly signed contracts to current market conditions.
The dependence of contract prices on the persistence effects of
shocks on the spot price suggests again the importance of the
relationship among h, a, and P.The greater is the equilibrium
fraction of trades carried out under contracts and the more sensitive is
speculative stockpiling to expected price appreciation, the larger is
the persistence parameter iP, and the greater is the weight placed on the
expected path of spot prices In determining the contract price. As
shown earlier, the extent of contracting (as determined by a)is a
function of the variance of the spot price and the covariances of buyer
and seller profits with the spot price. The more important are demand
shocks relative to supply shocks, the larger is a, and the more gradual
is contract price adjustment to shocks.
IV. EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Considerable attention has been devoted by macroeconomists and
industrial economists to the problem of "sticky" or inflexible prices,
anditsconsequences for market equilibrium and the effectiveness of
stabilization policy. The search for microeconomlc foundations of non—
Walrasian outcomes in labor and product markets has spawned many studies
of contracting. Our purpose in this paper has been to emphasize the— 23—
roleof contracts in markets (for many raw materials and basic
industrial commodities) in which long—term contractual arrangements and
spot markets coexist. These markets provide a laboratory for studies of
the behavior of prices in response to demand and supply fluctuations,
studies that can help to explain recent failures In estimating
econometric price equations.
Our analysis has been pursued with two goals in mind——(i) to
explain the existence of contracts in product markets and their
contribution to price stickiness, and (ii) to consider the impact of
demand and supply shocks on spot prices when market trades also take
place through long—term contracts. With respect to the first point, we
find that the relative importance of contracting is endogenous,
depending on, inter alia, the variance of the spot price and the sources
of underlying fluctuations. Consistent with the findings of previous
macroeconomic studies, we find that contracting and price rigidity are
more likely the more important demand shocks are relative to supply
shocks.
Second, we adapt our static model of the determination of contract
prices and quantities to discuss the adjustment of contract prices.
Introducing storage by speculators, we find that even transitory
disturbances exhibit persistence effects on spot prices in the presence
of contracts. Links between contracting and storage suggest a fruitful
extension in merging two strands of the recent macroeconomics literature
explaining "persistence"——that based on the role of inventories and that
based on overlapping (labor) contracts. In general, the predicted
adjustment of spot prices to transitory shocks depends on the use of— 24—
contracts,the ease with which speculative stocks can be adjusted, and
the source of the shocks.
Three extensions of our results seem particularly promising. The
analysis of econometric models of price determination in commodity
markets is an obvious application of the "two—price" model presented
here. As noted earlier, many commodity markets have experienced
multiple—price regimes, most notably copper and petroleum. Equation
(31) for the spot price indicates that the intertemporal correlation of
price changes depends on the importance of nominal contracting in the
market. Moreover, the relationship between the contract price and
expected future spot prices embodied in equation (35) depends on the
same factors determining the importance of contracting (as measured
by a). Hence we would expect that markets experiencing structural
changein terms of the source of or variance of shocks should undergo
changesin contracting structure. The change in contractingthen alters
thetime—series properties of the effects of shocks on prices and the
cross—sectional relationship between prices.
Nowhere is this pattern more apparent than in the oil market, where
vertical integration was replaced by a two—price system in the 1970s,
with contracts signed by newly—formed state—owned production
companies. Through the first major oil shock (in 1973—74), contract
trade was supplemented by a "thin" spot market (with about five percent
of total world volume). Given the increased volatility of the market,
almost half of all trades were carried Out Ofl the spot market by the
time of the second shock in 1979—80. In the oil market of the mid—
1980s, the vast majority of trades are effectively carried out on spot
markets, with a dramatic reduction in the term of contracts still— 25—
used.'4Similarly, the two—price system In the copper market was
replaced over the 1970s by spot trading on the London Metals Exchange.
These developments have important policy implications. Hubbard and
Weiner (1984) have shown that the optimal public strategic stockpile
responses to commodity price shocks depend on the persistence effects of
price changes (4'inequation (31)). Since persistence is an increasing
function/Of the relative importance of contracting, the optima!
stockpile policy and the effectiveness of any stockpile policy change
with the contracting regime.
That is, the question of which price to observe is Important; one
implication of the two—price model outlined above is that the behavior
of spot and contract prices may diverge substantially from that of
"average" prices. Since a represents the optimal fraction of trades
carried Out under contracts, the weighted—average acquistion price P
satisfies
(37) P =ac + (_)pS
To consider the effect on the volatility of average prices of
changes in the volatility of demand and supply, note that since
2 s var P =(1—a)var P
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2 2 2 . ____________ where =+ 0. Since < 0, the response of the
3var p5
variance of the composite price to a change in the volatility of
underlying shocks may be greater or less than the response of the
variance of the spot price to that same change, depending on the
sensitivity of the contracting decision to the variance of the spot
price (i.e., depending on the risk aversion of the transactors). That
Is, the relationship between the responses to changes in the variance
the "spot" and "average" prices is likely to be unstable. Hence, price
stabilization schemes facilitated by public stockpiles will in general
be unable to stabilize "average" prices by focusing on spot prices.
Second, in the real world, we find indexed contracts with elements
of both the contract and spot trades stylized in the previous
sections. Hence, while we have structured the model to think about the
optimal mix of individual trades carried out on auction markets and on
nominal contracts, we can interpret the results in terms of the optimal
degree of indexation of typical contracts in the industry. Indexation
of contracts corresponds to a low value ofin the preceding section.
We expect a higher degree of Indexation when (i) most shocks come from
the supply side and sellers' profits are more vulnerable (in the sense
defined before) to spot price changes, and (ii) demand shocks are more
important and buyers' profits are more vulnerable to spot price
changes. If we again assume that sellers' ex ante profits should be
more vulnerable to spot price fluctuations than buyer's profits, then
indexation is likely to be more extensive the more important are cost
shocks relative to demand shocks.
Twohypothesescan be readily tested using panel data on the
different industries. First, cyclical price sensitivity should be— 27—
greateras aggregate cost shocks become more important relative to
aggregate demand shocks. Specifically, changes in input prices should
be "passed through" more rapidly as cost shocks become more important.
Second, since seller vulnerability to price fluctuations should be
greatest early in the chain of production, price flexibility should be
greatest in Intermediate—goods Industries whose output goes to another
Intermediate—goods industry rather than to final consumption.'5
A third application of the two—price approach is to macroeconomic
studies of aggregate price flexibility. An extension to a dynamic
analysis of sticky prices Is logical, as "contracting" Is a
manifestation of the notion that prices are in some sense "costly to
adjust." This focus on costs of adjustment has appeared in Barro
(1972), Sheshlnski and Weiss (1977), and Rotemberg (1982). In this
literature, such costs are hypothesized to be of twotypes.First,
there is some (fixed) cost attached to changing prices, including, for
example, any physical costs of changing list prices. The second cost
relates to any negative effects of price changes on firms'
"reputations." Our model provides an alternative explanation for price
rigidity, and our use of nominal contracts does not rely on menu costs
or on a group of agents' being non—maximizers. Our model is similar in
many ways to the structure used by Roteinberg (1982), though, in our
framework, the analogue to costs of adjustment (i.e., the determinants
of c) differs across industries, so that treating such costs as
identical across Industries to facilitate aggregation for time—series
studies may pose a serious difficulty.
While we have concentrated our attention on multiple—price regimes
in Individual markets for primary or Industrial commodities, the— 28—
approachhas Important implications for aggregate models of prices and
quantities. If contractual arrangements In product markets are
endogenous, then models of price adjustment designed to examine the
impacts of demand and supply shocks on market equilibrium and the
potential for effective policy intervention must go further than
determining prices as a simple markup over standard unit input costs.
Moreover, to the extent that price rigidIty" implied by contracting is
the result of an optimizing process, profitable opportunities for policy
intervention (to alter the variances of prices or output) may be
lacking.— 29—
Footnotes
'Indeed, sticky product prices appear to antedate sticky wages (see the
early discussions in Mills, 1927, and Tucker, 1938).
Gordon (1981) provides a review of macroeconomic models of output
and price adjustment.
2Impllclt contract theory has been used to rationalize "Keynesian
unemployment" (Okun, 1981; Harris and Holmstrom, 1983). Formal
models of the influence of labor contracts on price flexibility can
be found in Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1979). In such models, the
predetermination of prices for some given period provides a role for
stabilization policy. An alternative approach is suggested by
Blanchard (1982)——namely that price adjustment in the aggregate
appears gradual because individual price adjustments are
desynchronized.
3rhe empirical model In Rotemberg (1982) offers a test of the importance
of customer markets, justifying price stickiness because of costly
price adjustment (in the sense of upsetting buyer—seller
relationships).
4Price dispersion can occur for two other reasons: (I) imperfect
information about prices, combined with costly search and
heterogeneous buyers and sellers; and (ii) price discrimination.
The first is likely to be important for differentiated retail goods
(Pratt, Wise, and Zeckhauser, 1979), but less so for homogeneous
commodities, whose prices are widely quoted. The second is illegal
under U.S. antitrust law, unless cost differences can be
demonstrated.
5copper and petroleum are oft—cited examples here; others worth mention
are coal, natural gas, aluminum, iron ore, and oil tanker
services. A small literature has developed on the two—price system
In the copper market (see Fisher, Cootner, and BaIly, 1972; McNicoi,
1975; Mackinnon and Olewiler, 1980; and DeKuljper, 1983). Although
the most dramatic episodes of spot—contract price divergence has
occurred in the oil market, analytical work has been scarce (see
Nordhaus, 1980; Verleger, 1982; Bohi, 1983; Hubbard and Weiner,
1983).
6Stigler and Kindahl (1970) showed that many Industrial commodities are
purchased on contracts whose typical duration is at least a year.
7Carlton (1979a) considers this issue from the sellers' point of view in
the context of the informational value of contracts. If all
uncertainty exists on the demand side, price discounts for long—term
contracts can be traced to this information role.
81n addition, as goods progress from raw materials to finished output, a
progressively larger share of the total cost reflects labor cost.
To the extent that wages are sticky, sellers' profits are more
vulnerable to spot price risk than those of buyers.— 30—
9Giventhe symmetrical structure of the model, the monopsony case is
analogous.
'0In many markets, middlemen (e.g., petroleum refiners, grain
processors) hold most of the inventory. In an empirical study of
the copper market, Bresnahan and Suslow (1985) examined the impact
of changes In the relationship between spot and contract prices on
inventory behavior.
"For a more general intertemporal optimizing model of inventory
behavior under uncertainty, see Hubbard and Weiner (1984).
'2ExtensIon of the model to consider serially correlated shocks
amplifies the results presented here. For dIscussIon of shocks
following autoregressive processes, see Hubbard and Weiner (1984); a
comparison to a one—price model can be made by seeing also Blinder
(1982).
'3We take the contract duration of T periods as given here. In general,
the length of the contract Is also a choice variable for the
negotiating parties (see for example Roberts, 1980).
'4For a more detailed discussion of the two—price system In the world
oil market, see Hubbard (1984).
15PrelImlnary tests along these lines using panel data on manufacturing
industries have produced results favorable to the predictions of the
model; see Doinowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1985).— 31—
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